In this article, we show the evolution of inequality for the largest economies of the Latin American region in the 21 st century, with separate consideration of income and wealth. We analyse the drivers of the changes in inequality and possible underlying causes, including the role of the new wave of leftist governments.
Introduction
Unequal societies display less social cohesion (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) and are more prone to capture of the political system by the elite (Stiglitz, 2012) . The study of inequality has recently regained a key role in economics, a phenomenon reinforced by a new systematic data-collection effort (Milanovic, 2005; Piketty, 2014; Galbraith, 2009, among others) .
Within this context, Latin America presents a very interesting case: on one hand, it represents the world's most unequal region; on the other, during the 21 st century, a significant and relatively uniform reduction in income inequality has occurred. This stylised fact has not gone unnoticed in the literature (Alvaredo & Gasparini, 2015; Gasparini & Lustig, 2011; Cornia, 2010; Gasparini et al., 2009; Gasparini, 2005) .
The 2000s, the decade in which these changes occurred, saw left-wing governments occupy the centre of the political stage; this placed inequality as a key element in the political agenda.
As a result, it becomes crucial to ask whether the policies set by these governments played a causal role in the observed inequality reduction. This is the primary aim of the present work.
Another motivation for this research is that economic policy in the region has always followed certain phases of relatively homogeneous formulae (compared to other countries), as in the case of state industrialisation or market-oriented reforms after the lost decade of the 1980s. Historically, these paradigms tend to characterise the whole region, with some heterogeneity. However, experience shows that, in many cases, such paradigms were imposed by objective elements (e.g. because of a wide range of macroeconomic shocks).
They started more as a set of pragmatic responses than as a real plan designed by the elite (Bértola & Ocampo, 2012) , and this initial phase of implementation is usually followed by learning, theorisation and consolidation, as was the case for the inward development theory (Sunkel, 1991) or the Washington consensus (Williamson, 1990) . Thus, we attempt to characterise the policies of the first fifteen years of the 21 st century to determine if they respond to a theoretical or political paradigm and/or if they are driven by a logic of material interests in the economic structure.
This article expands on the existing body of knowledge in several ways. First, we characterise both income and wealth inequality. Second, we separately examine the first and the second decades of the 21 st century, for the latter is associated with both political and economic changes. Third, we engage in an in-depth analysis of left-wing governments in the region.
Fourth, following , we discuss proximate determinants and causal hypotheses of the observed patterns.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a characterisation of the new Latin American left-wing parties; Section 3 describes the main stylised facts regarding inequality; Section 4 discusses the drivers of changes in income and wealth inequality;
Section 5 analyses potential causal explanations; Section 6 presents some conclusions.
The new Latin American left
The beginning of the 21 st century was marked by a series of left-wing electoral triumphs-at the municipal and national levels-in several Latin American countries. This period has been deemed the left turn in Latin America (Panizza, 2005; Castañeda, 2006; Schamis, 2006; Arditi, 2012) . During these years, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and
Venezuela have witnessed the establishment of left-wing governments.
This turn can be considered a response to new political and economic scenarios. With regard to the political or geopolitical dimension, it is necessary to look to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which marked the end of the political stigmatisation of left-wing parties, insofar as positioning in the political spectrum no longer implied a positioning for or against the United States (Castañeda, 2006) . In other words, the fall of the Soviet Union broadened the margins of manoeuvre for the region's regimes. With regard to the economic dimension, this turn can be partly ascribed to the failure of the policies of the Washington Consensus (Panizza, 2005; Arditi, 2012) . In fact, leftist discourse of this period is characterised by opposition to neoliberalism, whose political and economic principles define the measures promoted by the Washington Consensus (Panizza, 2005) .
The new Latin American left shares certain characteristics inherited from its liberalrepublican, populist and democratic ideological roots, which gravitate towards the principles of social justice and equality (Panizza, 2005) . However, the different trajectories followed by left-wing countries have been classified according to different historical and political taxonomies, whereas more homogeneity is considered to occur within the economic agenda.
From an historical point of view, Castañeda (2006) claims the existence of two lefts in the region. The first is derived from the Bolshevik Revolution and the Communist International, but this left is currently modern, reformist and internationalist. The second is populist, traditionalist and inward-oriented and reinvigorates elements of Latin American populism.
Castañeda places Chile, Uruguay and Brazil in the first group and Venezuela, Argentina and Bolivia in the second.
From a political-science point of view, Schamis (2006) builds off the classification proposed by Castañeda (2006) and adds further qualifications in terms of each country's party system.
The author argues that party systems can be classified in two groups: i) institutionalised or functioning; ii) disarticulated or collapsed. Countries such as Chile, Brazil and Uruguay would be classified in the former group, whereas Argentina and Peru would be classified in the latter.
In the disarticulated or collapsed group, the political process is determined by the business cycle, meaning that under periods of economic upswing, the prime minister (or the executive branch in general) manages to accumulate power and establish a particular institutional routine. As for the second group, Schamis proposes the category of the "petro-left" to refer to countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia, i.e. oil-or gas-exporting countries which maintain consensus through budgetary control and in which authority is characterised as arbitrary, unstable and directly linked to the availability of economic resources.
From an economic point of view, taxonomies are difficult to establish, for countries of the new left follow similar policies. In a nutshell, these countries accept capitalism as the only viable mode of production (Puyana, 2009 ), but the state performs an expanding role in terms of market regulation and resource redistribution (Arditi, 2012) Beyond this common economic framework, although the failure of the Washington Consensus pushed these countries to expand the role of the state (Arditi, 2012) , the need for larger political coalitions to attain and maintain the power, binding external constraint and financial markets' disciplinary role (which can punish radical discourse through capital flights), may have moderated (relatively) the economic reforms implemented (Panizza, 2005) -with the exception of Venezuela and Argentina. As a result of the balance of power, the economic policies of the new left have been characterised by a complex compromise between tension and convergence between neoliberal and critical reforms, giving rise to the implementation of prudent fiscal policy and measures oriented towards control inflation.
Markets have been recognised as a suitable mechanism for determining prices, the inefficiency of certain state interventions has been acknowledged and economic openness and regional integration have remained a fundamental axis in the economic policy (Panizza, 2005) . In fact, Cornia (2011) finds that the economic model of these governments belongs to the liberal paradigm, except for Bolivia and Venezuela, for these countries are labelled "radical-populist" largely due to large-scale redistributive efforts.
Inequality: stylised facts
The Latin American region is characterised by very large levels of inequality in many socioeconomic indicators.
In Figure 1 , we report the Gini coefficient of household net equivalised income for a group of Latin American countries and a selection of developed countries for the year 2000. The countries included were 1 the most important regional economies and most of the OECD countries for which data were available.
Some clarifications are in order. First, the data source was SWIID version 5.1 (Solt, 2016) ;
this data source included a methodology for data imputation and harmonisation. As a result, these measurements have a confidence interval. In Figure 1 , we plot the confidence interval at 95%.
Second, the Gini coefficient is a number between zero and one (we expressed it in percentage points), which can be interpreted as an indication of income-distribution (in)equality, between the extremes of perfect equality (zero) and maximum inequality (100%). The indicator satisfies certain undesirable properties, e.g. aggregate inequality is not the sum of the inequalities of the different subgroups, and the Gini assumes implicit distributive weighting, i.e. transferring a dollar to a person one quartile from the bottom has three times the value as the same dollar transferred to a person one quartile from the top (Atkinson, 2015) . However, this measure is the most commonly used; therefore, it favours comparability the most.
Third, the definition of income utilised includes all sources of primary income and state intervention through taxes and subsidies (excluding imputed rents and in-kind benefits, which may be important equalizers in some countries; Marx & Verbist, 2014) . In calculating the per capita level, the definition corrects for the scale economies inside the household through an equivalence scale which allows for the comparison of adults and children (in this case, the scale is the square root of household size). (Alvaredo & Gasparini, 2015; Gasparini et al. 2009 ).
However, if we observe the evolution of inequality in the first decade of the 21 st century, there is a general tendency towards reduction, which is in sharp contrast to the situation for the rest of the world (OECD, 2012; Alvaredo & Gasparini, 2015) . In Figure 2 , we plot CEPAL data for per capita income inequality. These coefficients were calculated from household surveys, with correction for underdeclaration or no response.
In the figure, we show the initial level in 2000 as well as the 2000-2010 and 2010-2013 variations. The distinction between these two periods is important, for the decade of 2000-2010 is characterised by global growth, whereas the 2010-2013 period encompasses the socalled Great Recession (Krugman, 2012) in the wake of the financial crisis of the United
States and the Euro Area, and the stabilisation and subsequent decline of commodities prices.
In the figure Considering the variation between 2000 and 2010, the only countries in which inequality grew were Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala. Of the three, only Guatemala started from a level of inequality above the median. However, the conclusion for Guatemala is not provided given that data availability meant the figures were computed over the period
1998-2006.
As mentioned, we can classify the countries in four groups according to the median split:
It is important to note that the groups emerging through these median splits do not reproduce the taxonomies of governments proposed by the literature and discussed in Section 2. To obtain a more detailed picture, we cannot limit ourselves to the income (the flow of resources at household disposal during the year); rather, we also must consider the accumulation of wealth, which constitutes the stock of net assets of households at a certain point in time. Wealth is important because it allows households to cope with negative shocks and maintain their standard of living.
Although data on the distribution of income are sufficiently large, with increasing levels of comparability both across countries and over the years (the data of the Luxembourg Income Studies, the harmonised database of the OECD, the SWIID of Solt, 2016) , the data sources for the distribution of wealth are more limited . Furthermore, there are a series of methodological problems that merit attention Bogliacino & Maestri, 2016) . In many cases, these data are incomplete because liabilities are recorded but corresponding assets are not, as is the case of durable consumption goods or in the case of human capital and the debt accrued to access higher education. In addition, public-pension entitlements are not computed. Finally, measurement problems exist, as net wealth can be negative, causing the Gini coefficient not to be bounded by the unity or not making it computable in certain cases; moreover, equivalence scales are seldom used, thereby reducing comparability. To wit, comparative studies on wealth are scarce (OECD, 2008; Davies, 2009; Maestri et al., 2014) . It is also necessary to clarify that even though the distinction between gross and net income refers to pre-and post-government intervention, when it comes to wealth, the distinction between gross and net refers to total assets and assets net of liabilities, respectively.
Wealth data usually come from three sources: survey data which tend to be biased because wealth is extremely concentrated and the richest are complicated to sample and interview; tax data which are especially suited for studying the top wealth shares, as in Piketty's approach (Atkinson et al. 2011; Piketty, 2014) ; and data computed through regression and imputation. The last one allows for comparability, but at the price of less robustness. To get a picture of the region, we relied on a source based on the estimated distribution of wealth through a regression and imputation technique (Shorrocks et al. 2010; 2015) . In light of data availability, we used 2010 and 2015 as the two temporal points. According to Shorrocks et al. (2010; 2015) , the data for most of the countries are of poor quality, with some exceptions:
Colombia and Mexico's data are classified as satisfactory, Chile's as fair, Brazil's as fair in 2015 yet poor in 2010 and Paraguay and Venezuela's as poor.
Following the methodology of Bogliacino and Maestri (2016) , we plot the data for the Gini coefficient of income and wealth in 2010 using a median split to identify four groups ( Figure   3 ) and then show the value for the end of the period (for the Gini of income, we focussed on the last available year). Shorrocks et al. (2010; 2015) . The median wealth is calculated including Nicaragua, for which we have no income data after 2009; therefore, Nicaragua was not included in the chart.
Using the median split, we identified the following groups: It is striking that the group with low income and low wealth inequality (Group 1) includes both Venezuela and Peru, for the two countries belong to opposite poles of the political spectrum. 3 Equally striking is that the group with low income and high wealth inequality (Group 4) includes the populist Ecuador and Bolivia, the conservative Mexico and the progressive Uruguay. Maestri et al. (2014) claimed that the differences in wealth inequality can be explained by structural differences, whereas the trend can be explained by national histories. Given that we are dealing with the same region, perhaps the structural characteristics determine the relatively high level of inequality but not the cross-country (within-region) differences, which are probably due to national idiosyncrasies. In summary, our diagnosis is that the region is characterised by sizeable income inequality, although it reduced the Gini coefficient during the first decade of the 21 st century. The rate of reduction has generally slowed in the aftermath of the global crisis, with some exceptions.
Wealth is more unevenly distributed than income, as usual , and between 2010 and 2015, of the fourteen countries considered, six have reduced the Gini coefficient of In Table 1 , we report data for the main drivers of household net income inequality. Data are in absolute change over the period 2000-2013 (or more recent data if available). As explained by , this type of analysis does not permit causal inference, as the market Gini and net Gini are co-determined. By definition, inequality in net household income reflects the relative importance of income sources (e.g. capital versus labour), the distribution within each source (particularly the earnings distribution, for the labour market represents the main source of income for most of the households) and the redistributive intervention of the state through taxes and subsidies. To guarantee comparability, we rely on the CEPAL database as a primary source, but we complemented the series with information from other sources to fill in any blanks whenever the metadata allowed us to do so.
A first driver is the functional distribution between labour and capital; in Table 1 , we report the variation of the share of the latter. Generally speaking, capital is more unevenly distributed, for accumulation is very sensitive to demographic factors (e.g. age) and is very inertial because of inheritance (Cowell et al. 2015; Piketty, 2014) . Therefore, a reduction in the labour share worsens income distribution. For all countries in the sample, the labour share was relatively stable but with a slightly negative trend. The only countries in which it increased were Costa Rica, Honduras and Brazil, whereas there was no variation in Ecuador and Paraguay; in the remaining countries, it decreased.
To detect changes in the labour market that statistically explain the largest part of the aggregate changes in the Gini coefficient, we considered four variables: change in educational attainment (human capital), change in minimum wage, change in the share of wages accruing to the top 20% and change in the share of informality.
According to the data, the average number of years of educational attainment in the economically active population grew, and this can be identified as a factor in the reduction of inequality. The correlation between the variation of Gini and this measure was negative and close to 50% (Pearson's rho = -0.48). According to Gasparini et al. (2009) , the Gini of years of education has also decreased. Brazil 1999 Brazil -2014 Colombia 1999 Colombia -2014 Costa Rica 2000 -2014 Ecuador 2000 Ecuador -2014 El Salvador 2000 -2014 Guatemala 1998 Guatemala -2014 Honduras 1999 Honduras -2013 Mexico 2000 Mexico -2014 Nicaragua 1998 Nicaragua -2009 Panama 2001 Panama -2014 Paraguay 1999 Paraguay -2014 Peru 1999 Peru -2014 For the last column, the differentiation between left, centre and right is determined by the orientation of the party in power. The left refers to parties defined as "communist", "socialist", "social-democratic" or "left wing". Chile, until 2013.
Nine out of seventeen countries showed a reduction of the share of earnings accruing to the richest quintile, implying that the labour market improved the distribution of income in these countries. Statistically, this variable showed the highest degree of association with the delta of the Gini coefficient, with a correlation of 92.19%. More robust econometric studies, such as that of , have shown that the evolution of the terms of trade benefitted unskilled labour in the region.
The change in minimum wage was associated with an improvement in income distribution.
The only case in which it decreased was Venezuela (due to inflation). The correlation with the delta of the Gini was negative and close to 30% (Pearson's rho = -0.318).
Informality decreased in all countries except the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and
Honduras, but the correlation with the change in income inequality was close to zero.
The increasing role of the state is on clear display in Table 1 . Social spending increased significantly in every country. In the table, we report the sum of all instalments of social expenditure in real terms and per inhabitant. Redistributive efforts were implemented in all countries, including Colombia, Mexico and Peru, which were not ruled by-or were only fleetingly controlled by-left-wing governments. Taxation also played a role, for direct taxes grew more than indirect taxes in GDP points during the period considered (for eleven of the seventeen countries). Curiously, although considered the leader in state-driven large-scale redistribution, Venezuela was an exception.
In Table 4 The results for the post-2010 period suggest that the egalitarian trend lost its strength and that its drivers have partly stagnated.
One could argue that demographic factors may play a role. In fact, a more healthy population and a relatively smaller household size may favour the performance in the labour market. 4 In the period under investigation the life expectancy increased in all countries, with the largest increases in Brazil (2.9), El Salvador (3), and Guatemala (3.6) , all data from CEPAL. The average household size decreased in all countries, according to CEPAL, except for Uruguay (where no change is observed), and Argentina (missing data). The largest explanatory factor is the former, whose correlation with the variation of the Gini is -.51 (for the household size, the Pearson's rho with the variation of the Gini of net income is barely .10). A counterargument is that these indicators are mainly associated with poverty reduction, which is also taking place in these countries and not really with inequality levels (but the common trend may explain the correlation).
Regarding the drivers of wealth inequality, there are two potential explanatory factors. On the one hand, financial wealth is more concentrated than housing wealth; thus, when the quantitative importance of the latter increases, wealth becomes more concentrated. The correlation between the change in the share of financial wealth in gross wealth and the change in the Gini coefficient of net wealth was positive, as shown in Figure 5 , but the change was negligible for a number of countries. On the other hand, access to debt may favour or reduce inequality, depending on the gradient of the access across the support of the distribution. The correlation between the change in the share of debt in gross wealth and the change in the Gini coefficient was barely negative, as shown in Figure 6 . As for financial wealth, the share was relatively stable.
Figure 5. Debt and wealth distribution
Source: Elaboration by the authors. Data from Shorrocks et al. (2010; 2015) .
Figure 6. Financial wealth and wealth distribution
Some causal hypotheses
Identifying causal factors behind the evolution of inequality is a particularly demanding task for two reasons. The complexities and interrelations within the economy require a general model which allows for the incorporation of the effects of aggregation, but the need for an in-depth treatment of the distributive effect of governmental intervention and structural heterogeneity (e.g. the presence of informality) essentially proscribes the use of standard models of general equilibrium, where homogeneity assumptions prevail.
Thus, we used a comparative method, seen in the other sections of this article, which relies on historical reconstruction to shed light on possible causal mechanisms.
At the beginning of this century, the countries of the region were characterised by typical underdevelopment features in terms of industrial structure, labour relations, access to public goods and very high levels of concentration in many dimensions.
The subsequent decade and a half featured a significant reduction in income inequality that was rather homogeneous across the countries studied. By all means, this is a result that must be acknowledged. Nevertheless, this change in distribution has barely altered the balance of power prevalent in these societies. For example, the richest 1% of the population has not Gini is very insensitive to the extremes of distribution (Atkinson & Morelli, 2010) . This insensitivity can be explained by statistical reasons and by the scarcity of data for the richest, caused by sampling design or insufficient survey collaboration.
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However, it does not cease to surprise that as the world became more unequal (OECD, 2012), South America went a different direction. In the same decades, we did not observe any homogeneous pattern among other countries of the Third World (Cornia, 2010) nor did the data suggest a convergence that might be consistent with regional trend (globally, distribution continued deteriorating in very unequal countries such as the United States). Another potential explanation, i.e. transition across political regimes, also fails to offer a sufficient account: countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece improved their distribution in the late seventies and eighties, when exiting dictatorships, whereas the transition from planned to market economies made Eastern European countries less equal .
Based on the data in Table 1 , we can see that the most important explanatory factors are the change in the endowment of human capital and more generous social policies. As suggested by Alvaredo & Gasparini (2015) , the labour market has played a role, but government intervention certainly had the greatest influence (Cornia, 2010) . In other words, excluding Venezuela (and in part Argentina) for the decision to violate macroeconomic compatibilities, 6 we see that region's countries promoted active redistribution (transference, direct taxes, higher minimum wage) without addressing the structural weaknesses of the economy. It is significant that Bértola & Ocampo (2013) suggest that even in Venezuela, nationalisation packages have been limited in comparison to the models of the developmental state of the past. Also, they suggest that even where there was an interventionist bias, e.g. in the oil and gas sector (Ecuador, Bolivia) or in industrial policy (Brazil), the macroeconomic policy mix of left-wing governments was relatively orthodox, especially given the strict restrictions stemming from a high degree of openness.
It is likely that the presence of Venezuela, the visibility of its achievements in certain areas (e.g. infrastructure and social housing) and its leading role in foreign policy (e.g. Petrocaribe 7 ) induced a redistributive response in the region as a way to placate the pressing popular demands for political representation (which often take the form of populist movements), especially in presence of a commodity boom that directly (royalties or public enterprise) or indirectly (export taxes) fed governmental budgets. However, this redistributive effort was implemented in a macroeconomic framework that blocked both structural change in the economy and redistribution of power in the political system.
We have two indirect pieces of evidence for this claim. In Table 2 , we report the introduction of conditional cash transfers (CCT). It can be seen that its presence has been rather diffuse in the region, except for Venezuela. The use of CCTs has been recommended by international organisations (in the case of Colombia, it was part of Plan Colombia; Rojas 2015), who claim that targeting reduces political discretionality, in turn increasing the efficacy of interventions.
However, CCTs attract criticism on two grounds. On the one hand, CCTs are accused of commodification and of favouring market provision of public and social goods instead of direct governmental provision through in-kind benefits (Lavinas, 2013) . On the other, they are said to induce a conservative bias in governments: 8 By eliminating criteria of universality and breaking the link between work and social protection, 9 whose contractualist logic is typical of social democracies, CCTs exclude labour organisations as a legitimate counterpart in government and allow for the maintenance of an economic policy under technocratic control within a substantial (neo)liberal hegemony. As is further seen from the last column of Table 2 , all countries maintain de jure central-bank independence, which is the cornerstone of financial orthodoxy because it induces financial-market discipline with respect to government expenditure.
signatories are: Venezuela, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Granada, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Suriname, Saint Lucia, Guatemala, El Salvador, San Cristobal and Nieves and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. 8 This mimics the discussion of transformism in Europe (Paggi & d'Angelillo, 1986) . Transformism, an Italian phenomenon (Trasformismo) in the transitional decades between the 19 th and the 20 th centuries, was criticised by liberal figures such as Pareto and Einaudi under the assumption that it stemmed from a political elite primarily interested in maintaining power. However, in the liberal optic, it is inscribed within the theory of modernisation and is based on certain stereotypes about the supposed superiority of Anglo-Saxon civil society. Historically, this discourse has legitimised the formation of technocratic classes of liberal inspiration which govern under the umbrella of any power coalition (Gramsci, 1966; 1977) . A very similar experience has occurred in the Brazilian, Colombian, Peruvian and related contexts within the region, where technocrats have managed the economy under very different political regimes, including dictatorships (Harberger, 1993) . 9 In many cases, they actually generate perverse incentives, such as marginal tax rates above 100%, as Atkinson (2015) explains, or act as a barrier to move out of informality. Another piece of indirect evidence for this thesis is found in Table 3 , in which we report some structural indicators of the economy, such as exports of primary goods over the total of goods, the extent of external constraint (percentage of years with current account deficit) and a measure of capital-accounts openness. With regard to openness, we constructed the variable based on the different releases of the Chinn & Ito Index (2006; 2008) . It captures the de jure liberalisation of the capital market. Although imperfect, it is standardised and mitigates the problem of endogeneity. Table 3 can be read in conjunction with Column 3 of Table 1 , where we report the variation of the labour share, and Column 4 of Table 1 , where we report the change in the educational attainment. Together, these data show that the countries of the region did not address any structural weaknesses, which characterise their status as dependent, with the possible exception of increased human capital (however, this is growing everywhere in the world).
The given that the purchasing power of export rose 104% for the former and 368% for the latter between 2000 and 2012, according to CEPAL data), the region's countries did not take measures to soften the external constraint (as shown by the size of the cumulative current account deficit). Since the 1970s, the financing of current account deficits established itself as a binding restriction preventing the implementation of a Keynesian macroeconomic framework (Barba & Pivetti, 2016; Panitch & Gindin, 2012) . 10 In the Dominican Republic, the share collapsed from 65.8 to 17.1 in 2001; this change was not justified by variations in trade (which improved by 1%) or variations in the purchasing power of exports (which decreased by 1%; both figures are taken from CEPAL). Likewise, it was not an effect of the financial crisis that exploded in 2003. Given that the trend after 2002 was weakly incremental, we excluded 2001 (also, no explanations were given in the CEPAL metadata). For Honduras, we used 2006 because there was a change in the methodology used by CEPAL related to the inclusion of re-export. For Guatemala and El Salvador, there was a break in the series in 2004 without justification in real or financial dynamics; of course, some negative shocks, such as a decrease in the price of coffee and sugar arose (or the collapse of the export of prawns and shrimp for El Salvador; Monje-Naranjo & Rodríguez-Clare, 2008) but were not concentrated in 2004 and were not large enough to explain the observed difference. The signing of a free-trade agreement with the US occurred in the same year, but the dynamics of the maquila industry did not reflect the observed break. Jumps were observed in items such as "unspecified consumer goods" (for both El Salvador and Guatemala), "other goods" (for El Salvador) and "other industrial input" (for Guatemala). In the absence of an explanation for these changes, which seem to reflect changes in accounting rules, we prefer to consider 2005 a starting point for the series.
A final item of this second piece of evidence is that instead of a reversal with respect to the liberalisation of capital movement of the 1990s, we see a prevalence of further liberalisation or stabilisation. The exceptions are Venezuela, Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Bolivia, Paraguay and El Salvador.
Ultimately, the post-2010 change in the size and direction of inequality indicators and the drivers of inequality are consistent with our theoretical hypothesis.
We consider our claim that geopolitical equilibrium and the change of the terms of trade in the region promote income equality in the region to be more empirically robust than either the overshooting hypothesis, which holds that the reduction in the 21 st century is a natural reversal that follows the excessive increase of inequality witnessed during the decades of the reforms (1980s and 1990s), or the claim that the observed changes are the result of a rebound from the effects of the macroeconomic crises at the end of the 20 th century. In fact, the regional pattern for the first decades of the 21 st century is much more homogeneous than the tendency observed in previous decades (Gasparini & Lustig, 2011; Gasparini, 2005) . In It is also very unlikely that the set of policies impacting inequality is explained exclusively by a sort of policy cycle. Worldwide, or even among developing countries, there are no systematic trends consistent with the aforementioned overshooting or rebound hypotheses (Alvaredo & Gasparini, 2015) . On balance, as stressed by Atkinson (2015) and Piketty (2014) , the evolution of inequality is generally explained by the set of policies adopted within the (relatively wide) margins defined by macroeconomic and microeconomic constraints. 
Conclusions
In this article, we analysed the distribution of income and wealth for the largest Latin American economies in the 21 st century. The evidence reveals that income inequality decreased, though wealth inequality displayed a much less homogeneous pattern.
The main important drivers are represented by a new effort in social expenditure and labourmarket changes. In regard to wealth, the main explanatory factor seems to be the growing importance of financial wealth over gross wealth.
The arrival of the global financial crisis and the change in the prices of commodities, which sustained the boom of the 2000s, have apparently weakened the strengths of these drivers.
Nevertheless, more and better evidence is still necessary.
In terms of causal hypotheses, data seem to support the idea that the new left had an indirect impact on the whole region insofar as it pushed stronger redistributive policies. This suggests that the Chavez effect, to offer one possible label, overcame the political orientation of the government in charge. However, countries did not address the structural weaknesses and maintained a relatively orthodox framework of macroeconomic policies, with limited exceptions; this responded to (domestic) political and (regional) geopolitical equilibria.
Obviously, the less favourable external environment is consistent with the change of direction in the years 2010-2015 given that, without structural change, the end of the commodity boom narrows the redistributive margin through austerity in spending.
The alternative hypothesis of a rebound effect subsequent to a growth of inequality at the end of the past century seems less coherent with the data. Further analysis is clearly needed.
This decades taught us that social agenda should be implemented within a framework of alternative macroeconomic policies that deal and soften macroeconomic constraints as well as a reform of political systems towards a contractualist/social-democratic model that allows for conflict management within institutional rules. 
